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Changes in the European conver-
gence model 
BY BEÁTA FARKAS* 
One of the fundamental goals of European integra-
tion is to provide an opportunity to less-developed 
member states for convergence and strengthening 
economic and social cohesion. Before 2008 the 
convergence process was impressive but the crisis 
is threatening its perspectives. This paper high-
lights some elements of the European convergence 
model which require more attention. It focuses on 
the so-called cohesion countries, the EU member 
states which receive support from the Cohesion 
Fund.1  
Convergence record 
To measure the results of the convergence, the 
GDP per capita is often used. It does not however 
express the growth in a population’s welfare that is 
central to the meaning of convergence. Another 
indicator, the actual individual final consumption 
(including expenditures on the consumption of 
goods and services by households and non-profit 
institutions serving households and in-kind social 
transfers) is a more appropriate measurement for 
this purpose. Therefore it is worth comparing the 
convergence of the cohesion countries to the EU 
average not only in GDP (as usual) but in final con-
sumption as well. In 1995, the contraction resulting 
from the economic transition came to an end in the 
post-socialist countries. Choosing this year as a 
basis for comparison, all of the cohesion countries 
were catching up with the EU-27 average, although 
to different degrees. The crisis has affected the 
cohesion countries’ convergence towards the 
EU-27 average (the position of all cohesion coun-
tries worsened in 2010, with the exception of Po-
land and Slovakia); nevertheless, these countries 
were able to preserve the bulk of their convergence 
                                              
*  University of Szeged, Hungary. 
1  The ‘old’ cohesion countries are Ireland, Greece, Portugal 
and Spain, the ‘new’ ones are Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Po-
land, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.  
results. In 2011 the seven lowest-income countries 
were able to improve their relative position by 1-2 
percentage points (Figure 1).  
Threats of the global crisis 
Although in 2009-2011 the growth rates in most of 
the new cohesion countries were again higher than 
the EU-15 average, they are not sufficient to pro-
vide a satisfactory pace of convergence in the fu-
ture. There is a danger that the slowdown of con-
vergence is not temporary but the beginning of a 
medium-term or even longer trend. The European 
convergence model was based on foreign capital 
inflows which made it possible to overcome the 
lack of savings in the cohesion countries. Europe is 
the only region where the different forms of private 
capital – both FDI and portfolio funds – flow from 
richer to poorer countries and from low-growth to 
high-growth countries. In the aftermath of the crisis, 
the external conditions of the European conver-
gence model have been changing unfavourably. 
The contracting markets of the European Union do 
not support export-led growth in the cohesion coun-
tries, while the management of the European debt 
crisis and stricter financial regulation decrease the 
capital available. Financial markets’ risk evalua-
tions may remain higher, even for those cohesion 
countries that are not affected by more severe 
financial difficulties. Due to the indebtedness of 
households and governments, the diminishing ex-
ternal resources and markets may not substitute for 
domestic resources and markets even if the do-
mestic saving rates increase.  
 
The crisis has highlighted the vulnerability of the 
convergence model implying the dependence on 
foreign capital. Some experts made several policy 
suggestions to reorient the European convergence 
model. They argue that a reduction in the private 
sector savings-investment gap is unavoidable. This 
may lead to the repression of domestic demand. A 
sustained re-launch of growth requires a more 
efficient use of domestic savings than in the past. 
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Figure 1 
Per capita individual final consumption at purchasing power parity  
in the cohesion countries (EU-27 = 100) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on AMECO database. 
 
Limits of the European convergence model 
There are further aspects of the European conver-
gence model that should be taken into account. In 
theory, FDI can play an enhancing role in produc-
tivity growth directly (through investment) and indi-
rectly (through spill-over effects). Both channels 
work in the cohesion countries but the experience 
of two decades suggests that the FDI-based mod-
ernization has its limits.  
 
It may be instructive to have a look at the quite 
recent experience of Continental and Northern 
Europe. After the collapse of communism, compa-
nies located in Continental and Northern Europe 
successfully adapted to the new conditions. These 
companies located their assembly activities in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, taking advantage of lower 
wages. Thus their flexibility in offshoring could 
strengthen the competitiveness of Central and 
Eastern Europe. The region could integrate not 
only within the EU but also within the world econ-
omy through increased investment and productiv-
ity.2 However, does this type of FDI-based conver-
gence model ensure long-run convergence? Al-
though there are possibilities of upgrading along 
the value chain, there is no reason to assume that 
foreign companies will abandon their key positions 
in innovation, technology development and strate-
gic decision-making.3 It seems to be much more 
                                              
2  In the new cohesion countries, the main form of foreign 
capital was FDI, while the old cohesion countries attracted 
portfolio and other capital inflows. According to Gill and 
Raiser (2012), the reason for the difficult situation in South-
ern Europe is that these countries did not participate in the 
value chain reconfiguration from the late 1990s and that they 
have few global companies. Moreover, the Central Euro-
pean countries were the primary beneficiaries of rapid tech-
nology transfer; here the FDI went into manufacturing, which 
is a tradable sector. In the Baltic states, Bulgaria and Roma-
nia, the FDI was biased in favour of banking, real estate and 
other non-tradable sectors.  
3  The European Competitiveness Report points out: “Despite 
high levels of internalization in the EU-12, the bulk of for-
eign-owned R&D and innovation activity takes place be-
tween EU-15 member states’ (European Commission, 
2010b).  
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likely that the current labour and production division 
will essentially be reproduced.  
 
Another possibility to increase the growth potential 
through FDI could be that spill-over effects help 
domestic companies to foster competitiveness that 
could accelerate the catching-up process. How-
ever, the literature on FDI spill-overs suggests un-
ambiguously positive productivity effects in the 
case of vertical linkages. In these linkages the do-
mestic firms occupy the dependent position in 
these relationships. The horizontal spill-over effects 
seem to be weak in the overwhelming majority of 
empirical investigations (Gorodnichenko et al., 
2007; Hanousek et al., 2010).4  
 
Due to the low initial GDP levels in the cohesion 
countries, the European convergence model pro-
vided sufficient space for the cohesion countries to 
develop – as long as growth in the Old EU re-
mained relatively strong. If the crisis had not oc-
curred, the poorer countries could have further 
developed within the framework of that model, 
even if the development would have been concen-
trated in the areas that had attracted foreign capital 
(typically the capital cities and their agglomera-
tions). 
 
However, it is remarkable that the Czech Republic, 
which had one of the highest initial GDP levels in 
Central and Eastern Europe and followed a very 
balanced fiscal and economic policy, did not con-
verge towards the EU-27 average in final consump-
tion between 1995 and 2011 (Figure 1). Slovenia, 
with its higher initial GDP level, has achieved 
greater convergence but it has always chosen dif-
ferent means, focusing on the domestic economy 
and had in the meantime accumulated imbalances 
prior to the crisis. 
 
The Irish economic development is also instructive 
as regards the FDI-based modernization. A state 
agency, the Industrial Development Authority, was 
very successful at identifying emerging sectors and 
in attracting multinational companies in those sec-
                                              
4  Both studies provide a comprehensive overview of the 
literature concerning spill-over effects in emerging Europe.  
tors to Ireland. Since the Culliton Report in 1992 
the Irish government has striven for a ‘holistic ap-
proach’ to industrial development policy, perhaps 
the most consciously among the cohesion coun-
tries. This meant that they tried to eliminate the 
serious dichotomy that existed between domestic 
and foreign-owned firms. The Irish economic de-
velopment policy was successful; many domestic 
SMEs grew from the foreign-owned firms through 
linkages and spill-overs, mainly in the software 
industry (Andreosso-O’Callaghan and Lenihan, 
2006; Barry and Bergin, 2012). Despite these re-
sults, labour productivity was still higher in foreign-
owned enterprises in every manufacturing industry 
in 2006. In Ireland foreign firms are highly concen-
trated in large and high-tech manufacturing activi-
ties even after a twenty-year catching-up process. 
In Sweden, foreign firms are more evenly distrib-
uted across manufacturing and services and do-
mestic firms control the highly export-oriented and 
technology-based engineering sector (Andreosso-
O’Callaghan and Lenihan, 2010).  
 
We could not find complete data on the productivity 
difference between foreign-owned and domestic 
firms across EU member states. However, the 
foreign-owned enterprises typically belong to large 
companies not only in Ireland but in the cohesion 
countries in general. We can use therefore the 
labour productivity difference between large com-
panies and SMEs as a rough proxy to the produc-
tivity difference between foreign-owned and do-
mestic firms. Figure 2 shows that the difference 
between large firms and SMEs is small in five co-
hesion countries: Estonia, Malta, Slovenia, Latvia 
and Slovakia. In the case of Estonia, Latvia and 
Malta, the large companies’ contribution to GDP is 
far below the EU average as the FDI went rather to 
the non-tradable service sector.5 Slovenia and 
Slovakia are the only cohesion countries where the 
large companies and manufacturing contribute to 
GDP substantially and the productivity difference 
between the large firms and SMEs is at the level of 
North-Western EU member states. In the other  
                                              
5  In Estonia and Latvia, the FDI thereby fuelled an unsustain-
able boom and contributed to the development of housing 
bubbles. 
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Figure 2 
Labour productivity difference between large enterprises, medium-size enterprises and SMEs  
in per cent of labour productivity of large enterprises, 2007 
 
Note: Labour productivity is measured by gross value added per employed person. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Wymenga et al. (2011). 
 
cohesion countries and Italy the difference is far 
beyond 40 percentage points. In most cases, the 
productivity of medium-sized enterprises shows a 
similar trend but the degree of difference is 
smaller.6  
Conclusions 
The FDI-based convergence model provided an 
opportunity for the cohesion countries to develop 
and catch up with the North-Western countries of 
the EU. However, this model has some limitations. 
The concept of a single market presumed that 
                                              
6  We chose the last year before the crisis to avoid the tempo-
rary distortion effects. 
competition forces induce improvements of produc-
tivity throughout the economy. Nevertheless ex-
perience suggests that much larger differences 
between foreign-owned/large firms and domestic 
enterprises/SMEs persisted over decades in the 
majority of the cohesion countries. Abundant for-
eign capital inflows – in the form of FDI in Ireland 
and the post-socialist countries, in the form of port-
folio and other investment in the Mediterranean 
countries – concealed this problem.  
 
The cohesion policy supports SMEs first of all as 
job creators but also with their technical upgrading. 
However, it does not address the problems of the 
duality of developments observed in the cohesion 
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countries’ economies (see Council Regulation (EC) 
No. 1083/2006, Regulation (EC) No. 1080/2006). 
The Europe 2020 strategy also does not pay any 
attention to this issue (European Commission, 
2010a).  
 
If foreign capital becomes scarcer, the productivity 
gap between foreign and domestic firms could 
become even wider (and so will the productivity 
gap between large enterprises and SMEs). In the 
forthcoming years, it will be even more important to 
promote the positive spill-over effects through a 
more active economic policy. The policy measures 
to develop a competitive domestic economy are 
essentially in the hands of national governments. 
The EU policy framework does not make it impos-
sible to foster the domestic economy mainly 
through the development of SMEs. Slovakia and 
Slovenia seem to be successful in this field. How-
ever, the efforts of the Irish governments over dec-
ades show how difficult it is to reach long-lasting 
results. The support of SMEs is always on the 
agenda of the Hungarian governments but the 
results are not impressive. A general European 
SME support programme cannot replace the tar-
geted approach. The competitiveness deficits of 
the Mediterranean countries indicate that the ob-
stacles to the development of SMEs (e.g. restricted 
access to capital, rigidity of regulation etc.) are 
special not only in the post-socialist countries but in 
all cohesion countries.  
 
A successful SME development policy is a neces-
sary but not sufficient condition for the reduction of 
the productivity gap between foreign and domestic 
firms. We cannot avoid drawing a further conclusion 
from the lessons of the crisis. The crisis revealed 
that only countries belonging to the EU’s core had 
internationally competitive domestic companies. 
Ireland has the better chance to restore its position 
due to its geographic location, small size and the 
well-embedded market institutions. But the Mediter-
ranean countries have diverged from the EU-27 
average both in GDP and final consumption for 
some years and they have slipped out of the core 
countries. Finland was the last country to carry out a 
modernization which led to an economy based not 
only on internationally competitive foreign-owned 
but also domestic companies. However, the recipes 
of the 1970s and 1980s can no longer be applied 
either within or outside the EU. The question of an 
adequate economic development policy in the co-
hesion countries beyond SME support was not 
raised in the period of affluent foreign capital in-
flows. Now, we cannot avoid it anymore. 
 
The modification of the current convergence model 
is a serious challenge for European integration. We 
cannot assume that all economies will adapt them-
selves successfully to the new circumstances and 
the convergence will return to its former speed. The 
coming years make some changes in the concept 
of integration necessary. The European Union 
must take efforts to maintain cohesion because a 
certain degree of inequality leads to disintegration. 
If the speed of convergence remains a measure of 
the success of integration, as was the case in the 
past decades, the EU will doom itself. It is a further 
question how the populations accept this new pe-
riod because the perspectives of quick conver-
gence was the most attractive element and the 
main legitimating basis of EU membership in the 
cohesion countries. 
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